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Case Comments
Torts: Issue of Comparative Fault Cannot Be Retried In-
dependently of Issue of Liability
In an action to recover damages for injuries sustained in an
intersection collision, the issues of negligence, causation, com-
parative negligence and damages were submitted to the jury in
the form of special verdicts, as authorized by Minnesota's
recently adopted comparative negligence statute.' The jury
found both drivers negligent and that the negligence of each
was a direct cause of the accident and injuries, but assigned 90%
of the causal negligence to defendant driver and only 10% to
plaintiff driver. Defendants moved for an order amending the
apportionment of causal negligence to 50% each, or in the alter-
native, for a new trial limited solely to the apportionment of
negligence between the two drivers. The trial court denied the
first motion but granted the alternative motion for a new trial
limited to the apportionment issue on the ground that the appor-
tionment of negligence found by the jury was contrary to the
overwhelming weight of the evidence. Plaintiff successfully
petitoned the Minnesota Supreme Court for discretionary
review of the trial court's order.2 The court, per Rogosheske, J.,
reversed and remanded for a retrial of the general issue of liabil-
ity as well as the issue of comparative negligence, holding that
it is neither feasible nor practical to grant a new trial limited to
the single issue of the percentage of negligence attributable
to each driver. Juvland v. Mattson, 289 Minn. 365, 184 N.W.2d
423 (1971).
A partial new trial or a new trial limited to a single issue
was not generally available at common law where a verdict
was thought to be single and indivisible.3 However, this
rule was modified early in the United States,4 and at present
such limited new trials are available in most jurisdictions, 5
1. Mu. STAT. § 604.01(1) (1969).
2. Discretionary review was granted pursuant to Rule 105, MINN.
R. Civ. Arp. P.
3. E.g., Barnett v. Loud, 243 Mass. 510, 137 N.E. 740 (1923); see
generally Annot., 1915E L.R.A. 240.
4. See, e.g., Simmons v. Fish, 210 Mass. 563, 97 N.E. 102 (1912).
5. Leipert v. Honold, 39 Cal. 2d 462, 466, 247 P.2d 324, 327 (1952);
see, e.g., Leonard v. Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 265 Wis. 464,
470, 62 N.W.2d 10, 13 (1953).
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including Minnesota.6 In determining whether a new trial can
be limited solely to the issues upon which there was error or
whether the entire case must be retried, the rule most often
cited is that it must clearly appear that the issue to be retried
independently is so distinct and separable from the other issues
in the case that a trial of it alone may be had without injustice.7
It also must appear that the other issues in the case were
properly decided,8 and the court must be alert for evidence of
passion or prejudice that is likely to have affected more than
one issue.9
The application of these rules leaves much to the discretion
of the courts. The result is a lack of agreement on which issues
in a negligence action can be retried independently. Where the
error in the original trial goes only to the award of damages,
most courts hold that it is permissible to grant a new trial on the
amount of damages only, since the issue of damages is ordinarily
distinct from the other issues in a negligence action.10 Where
the error goes only to the issue of liability and it is clear that
the award of damages is proper, some courts allow the verdict
on damages to stand and will order a retrial limited solely to the
question of liability." Some courts have allowed the issue of
proximate cause to be split off from the issue of negligence for
separate retrial, 2 but this practice has been disapproved in Min-
nesota on the ground that negligence and proximate cause are
too closely related to be tried independently.' 8 The question
that arose in Juvland, whether the apportionment of negligence
could be retried apart from the issue of liability, has been con-
sidered in Wisconsin, where the cases appear to hold that a new
trial may be limited to the apportionment issue.' 4 In Minnesota,
6. MINN. R. Civ. P., Rule 59.01, provides that a new trial may be
granted on all or part of the issues. See 14 DuN. DIG. § 7079 (3d ed.
1954) and cases cited therein.
7. See, e.g., Gasoline Products Co., Inc. v. Champlin Refining Co.,
283 U.S. 494 (1931); Koenigs v. Werner, 263 Minn. 80, 116 N.W.2d 73
(1962).
8. See, e.g., Sleeter v. Progressive Assur. Co., 191 Minn. 108, 253
N.W. 531 (1934).
9. Leipert v. Honold, 39 Cal. 2d 462, 247 P.2d 324 (1952); see
Swanson v. Thill, 277 Minn. 122, 153 N.W.2d 85 (1967).
10. See, e.g., Seydel v. Reuber, 254 Minn. 168, 94 N.W.2d 265 (1959).
See also Annot., 29 A.L.R.2d 1199 (1953).
11. See, e.g., Alex v. Jozelich, 248 Minn. 27, 78 N.W.2d 440 (1956);
Annot., 34 A.L.R.2d 988 (1954).
12. See, e.g., Burke v. Hodge, 211 Mass. 156, 97 N.E. 920 (1912);
Virginia Ry. & Power Co. v. Dressier, 132 Va. 342, 111 S.E. 243 (1922).
13. Koenigs v. Werner, 263 Minn. 80, 116 N.W.2d 73 (1962).
14. The Wisconsin cases, Caldwell v. Piggly Wiggly Madison Co.,
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however, the case was one of first impression."5
The Juvland court denied a retrial limited to the appor-
tionment issue because it doubted that such a retrial would
conserve litigation time or expense and because of a concern
that a limited retrial could prove prejudicial to plaintiff. Judi-
cial economy would not be achieved, the court argued, because
the question of the negligence of each driver is not separate
and distinct from the apportionment issue'0 and evidence bear-
ing on both issues would have to be introduced in any retrial.
On the other hand, the court felt that prejudice to the plaintiff
could result if the court were required to instruct the jury that
both drivers had been found negligent in an earlier trial. Such
an instruction, the court argued, might create in the mind of the
jury an impression that both drivers bore substantial responsi-
bility for the accident regardless of what the evidence indi-
cated. 17
The court's argument that a limited retrial would not save
time or expense is basically sound since much of the evidence
on negligence would have to be presented to give the jury a
basis for apportionment.J 8 However, trial time is not the only
relevant consideration. Conceivably, limiting the retrial would
simplify the jury's task and result in a savings of jury-delibera-
tion time.
The court's belief that plaintiff could be prejudiced by
the trial court's instruction on negligence is less convincing.
While an unqualified assertion by the trial judge that both
parties have been found negligent conceivably could leave the
jury with the impression that both have been found guilty of
substantial carelessness contributing to the accident, the court is
not powerless to correct this mistaken impression. The court
32 Wis. 2d 447, 145 N.W.2d 745 (1966); Firkus v. Rombalski, 25 Wis.
2d 352, 130 N.W.2d 835 (1964); Lund v. Thorne, 266 Wis. 239, 63 N.W.2d
317 (1954), contain language indicating that it is the practice in that
state to allow retrials limited to the apportionment issue. However, in
these cases the trial court is instructed to allow evidence on the issue of
liability to be introduced in the retrial to aid the jury in the appor-
tionment decision. Under this practice liability is not at issue in the
retrial but it is, in a sense, relitigated. Thus it is rather misleading to
state without qualification that Wisconsin permits retrials limited solely
to the issue of apportionment of negligence.
15. Juvland v. Mattson, 289 Minn. 365, 367, 184 N.W.2d 423, 424
(1971).
16. Id. at 369, 184 N.W.2d at 425.
17. Id. at 370, 184 N.W.2d at 425.
18. Id. at 368, 184 N.W.2d at 425.
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could warn the jury that no judgment regarding the relative
fault of the drivers follows from the mere fact that both have
been found negligent and could instruct that it would be con-
sistent with these findings that one driver's negligence was very
slight while the other's was substantial. On the other hand, as
is the case with many precautionary jury instructions, there is
a great risk that the judge's warning would go unheeded.
A more important argument against granting a retrial lim-
ited to the apportionment question is that error in a jury's
findings on apportionment may reflect an erroneous evaluation
of the evidence submitted on negligence. As stated above, the
liability question and the apportionment question are determined
on much the same evidence. In making its apportionment the
jury is to view
the conduct of the parties as a whole and in doing so must con-
sider the standard of care applicable to the acts or omissions
constituting the tort-feasor's conduct, the nature and character
of the conduct and its intensity, directness and remoteness, as a
substantial factor in the chain of causation. 19
Since most of these factors cited as relevant to the apportion-
ment decision are relevant to the determination of liability or
causal negligence, an erroneous decision on one of the issues
could be taken as an indication that the related issue has not
been properly decided.20  If the jury has misread or misused
the evidence in determining one issue, that mistake is likely to
be carried over in its determination of the other issue upon
the same evidence. The limited retrial is needed to avoid the
unfairness to the successful litigant of reopening an issue
which has been fairly tried because another issue was improp-
erly decided.21 However, this need obviously does not arise if,
as is arguably the case in Juviand, the liability issue has been
improperly decided.
In an intriguing dictum the court suggests that it is "con-
ceivable"22 or at least "hypothetically possible" 23 that a retrial
19. Lovesee v. Allied Development Corp., 45 Wis. 2d 340, 344, 173
N.W.2d 196, 199 (1970).
20. Although it is also possible that the erroneous determination
of the apportionment issue was the result of misleading jury instructions
with respect to that issue, it is more reasonable to assume a misinterpre-
tation of evidence.
21. See Simmons v. Fish, 210 Mass. 563, 568, 97 N.E. 102, 104 (1912).
The limited retrial is also necessary, or at least useful, for reasons of
judicial economy.
22. 289 Minn. at 369, 184 N.W.2d at 425.
23. Id. at n.4.
[Vol. 56:973
CASE COMMENTS
could be limited to the issue of apportionment in a case where
there were detailed findings of negligence from the first trial..2 4
The court suggests that findings similar to the following hypo-
thetical examples may make a limited retrial in a case like Juv-
land more practical:2 5
At or just prior to the collision, was plaintiff driver negligent
with respect to:
(a) Lookout? Answer: No
(b) Control? Answer: No
(c) Speed? Answer: Yes
At or just prior to the collision, was defendant driver negligent
with respect to:
(a) Lookout? Answer: Yes
(b) Control? Answer: Yes
(c) Speed? Answer: Yes
It seems likely that such specific findings on the negligence
issue would save both the time and expense of unnecessary liti-
gation by allowing the court on retrial to omit as irrelevant
certain evidence as to plaintiff's lookout and control. Appar-
ently the Juvland court was also of the opinion that on a retrial,
jury instructions based on detailed findings such as these would
be less misleading to the jury. That some prejudice could still
result, however, seems clear since an instruction based upon
these findings might leave the jury with the incorrect impression
that it had been established that plaintiff's negligence was
roughly one-third as great as that of the defendant, plaintiff
having been found negligent in just one respect while defendant
was found negligent in three..2 6 This would be prejudicial to
24. While the cautious and hypothetical language the court uses
should be a warning that the court may not see the suggestion as a gen-
uine possibility, nevertheless the dictum may be the source of future
litigation. It is therefore useful to provide some analysis of the sug-
gestion.
25. The hypothetical findings here are based on a form of question
cited by the court as a permissible alternative to the general question
on negligence that was used in Juvland. The general question was:
"At and immediately prior to the accident was [the driver] negligent
in the operation of his automobile." 289 Minn. at 367, 184 N.W.2d at
424. The court is careful to note that it does not recommend either
form of question as preferable. Id. at 368 n.3, 184 N.W.2d at 424 n.3.
26. It is well established in Wisconsin, the leading jurisdiction in
the development of the comparative negligence doctrine, that the num-
ber of respects in which a party is found negligent (causally negligent)
need not govern the percentage of fault that is attributed to that party.
See, e.g., Horn v. Snow White Laundry & Dry Cleaning Co., 240 Wis.
312, 3 N.W.2d 380 (1942) (where jury finds defendant guilty of three
negligent acts but plaintiff guilty of only one there is no requirement
that negligence be apportioned in a three-to-one ratio); Van Wie v.
Hill, 15 Wis. 2d 98, 112 N.W.2d 168 (1961) (jury could find plaintiff
1972]
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the plaintiff in any case like Juvland where the plaintiff's fault
was arguably minimal compared to defendant's. 2 This risk of
prejudice provides one reason for denying a retrial limited to
the apportionment issue even where there were detailed find-
ings of negligence. In addition to this objection to the court's
suggestion, the fact remains that error on the apportionment
issue suggests that the jury may not have properly decided
the negligence or liability issue.28  This should be sufficient
reason to deny a limited retrial in such a case, and therefore it
is hoped that little reliance will be placed on the dictum in Juv-
land suggesting that it is an open question whether a retrial
could be limited to the issue of apportionment if a more detailed
special verdict were available from the first trial.
was more negligent than defendant even where defendant was negligent
in three respects and plaintiff in only one).
27. 289 Minn. at 370, 184 N.W.2d at 425.
28. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
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Contingent Fee Contracts: Contract Related to
Divorce Action Upheld
Plaintiff attorney was engaged by defendant to secure a
divorce and a property settlement from defendant's husband
who had deserted her and had taken all the securities purchased
by them during the marriage. Defendant was unable to pay
for extensive legal and investigative services to locate her hus-
band in the attempt to recover this property. It was known
that defendant's husband had attempted to obtain a Nevada
divorce but there was uncertainty whether it had been con-
cluded, or, if it had, whether it was valid. Plaintiff and defend-
ant entered into two separate retainer agreements. The first
contract provided for a fee of $400 for plaintiff's services in
obtaining a Minnesota divorce against defendant's husband.
Only the homestead and inconsequential personal property was
to be involved in that action. The second contract provided for
a fee equal to 25 per cent of the personal property defendant
might recover from her husband in any state except Minnesota.
Plaintiff commenced an action for divorce in defendant's behalf
which resulted in a default judgment awarding defendant a
divorce. Meanwhile plaintiff located defendant's husband in Los
Angeles and retained a California law firm to aid in the recovery
of defendant's property. After exhaustive research by plaintiff,
the California firm brought suit against defendant's husband.
Shortly thereafter defendant terminated the attorney-client
relationship with plaintiff but retained the services of the Cali-
fornia firm. Plaintiff brought an action against the administra-
trix of defendant's estate to recover the reasonable value of legal
services rendered in defendant's behalf. The lower court entered
an order of dismissal, holding the contingent fee arrangement
void as contrary to public policy. The Minnesota Supreme
Court reversed, holding that such a contingent fee arrangement
is not void as against public policy. A lawyer who is dismissed
by his client before recovery of property but after substantial
legal services have been performed should not be precluded
from recovering the reasonable value of his services. Burns v.
Stewart, 188 N.W.2d 760 (Minn. 1971).
The weight of authority holds contingent fee contracts to
be valid and binding1 provided there are no elements in such
1. See generally Note, Contingent Fee Contracts: Validity, Con-
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contracts which render them contrary to public policy. Contin-
gent fee contracts in divorce-related actions are generally held
to be against public policy and void.' This strict rule of invalid-
ity originated from situations where contingent fee contracts
provided for payment to the attorney only if he procured the
divorce. The attorney thus acquired a personal interest in pre-
venting reconciliations. Therefore the courts view such con-
tracts as contrary to the public policy against destruction of
marriages. 3 In the past Minnesota has not only followed this
strict rule of invalidity,4 but has gone beyond it, taking the
trols and Enforceability, 47 IowA L. Ray. 942 (1962); Comment, Attorney
and Client-Contingent Fee Contracts-Divorce Action, 7 VAND. L. REV.
120 (1953). The doctrine of champerty has been found inapplicable to
contingent fee contracts in all states.
2. See, e.g., McConnell v. McConnell, 98 Ark. 193, 136 S.W. 931
(1911); Ayres v. Lipschutz, 68 Cal. App. 134, 228 P. 720 (1924); Sobieski
v. Maresco, 143 So. 2d 62 (Fla. App. 1962); Evans v. Hartley, 57 Ga.
App. 598, 196 S.E. 273 (1938); In re Sylvester, 195 Iowa 1329, 192 N.W.
442 (1923); Overstreet v. Barr, 255 Ky. 82, 72 S.W.2d 1014 (1934); Jordan
v. Westerman, 62 Mich. 170, 28 N.W. 826 (1886); Baskerville v. Basker-
ville, 246 Minn. 496, 75 N.W.2d 762 (1956); Van Vleck v. Van Vleck, 21
App. Div. 272, 47 N.Y. Supp. 470 (1897); Opperud v. Bussey, 172 Okla.
625, 46 P.2d 319 (1935). Texas appears to be the lone exception to the
rule that these contracts are void in divorce cases. See also Archer v.
Griffith, 390 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. 1965) (such contracts are void if the con-
tingent fee is exorbitant and unreasonable); Coen v. Stout, 245 S.W.2d
971 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Kull v. Brown, 165 S.W.2d 1011 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1942).
3. In addition to being contrary to the public policy against the
destruction of marriages, a contingent fee arrangement in a domestic
relations action may run afoul of at least two other policies neither of
which was relevant in Burns. First, when the contingent fee is a sizeable
percentage of alimony it may in effect deprive the wife of part of her
support and maintenance for her future living expenses. Normally the
courts allow a certain amount for attorney's fees and then establish the
alimony such that the wife will not bear that expense. The assignment
of a percentage of alimony in advance through a contingent fee contract
thus amounts to an interference with the duties of the court to award
alimony on the basis of what is required for maintenance and support of
the wife. See In re Smith, 42 Wash. 2d 188, 254 P.2d 464 (1953). Second,
if the attorney contracts for a high percentage of the alimony or prop-
erty settlement, the fees generated by such provisions may prove un-
duly burdensome or oppressive to the parties. Klampe v. Klampe, 137
Minn. 227, 163 N.W. 295 (1917). However, the court may mitigate this
problem by an upward adjustment of the alimony award.
4. Baskerville v. Baskerville, 246 Minn. 496, 75 N.W.2d 762 (1956);
Klampe v. Klampe, 137 Minn. 227, 163 N.W. 295 (1917). In Klampe
the court invalidated a contract under which an attorney was to receive
50 per cent of any properties or moneys obtained by settlement or by
action for his client in a then pending divorce proceeding. However, it
did allow recovery in quantum meruit. A similar result was reached in
the Baskerville case, where the court stated:
[I]t is not fitting that it should be for the interest of an attorney
[Vol. 56:979
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minority position that even a recovery of the reasonable value
of the attorney's services in quantum meruit is barred.5
Recent decisions in other jurisdictions appear to presage a
trend toward modification of the strict rule against contingent
fee contracts in divorce-related actions.0 The primary justifi-
cation for such a contract here, as in other areas of the law, is
that it is a method of providing representation for impecunious
persons.7 However, the relaxation of the strict rule of invalid-
ity has stemmed not from this classic justification, but rather
has resulted from a willingness of courts to determine on the
particular facts of the case whether the contingent fee arrange-
ment does, in fact, promote divorce and therefore violate the
public policy against destruction of marriages. 8
Following this trend the court held that the contingent fee
arrangement in the instant case was not void as against public
policy because the arrangement involved did not promote
divorce. The court refused to apply the strict rule that every
contingent fee arrangement involved in a divorce action is void
on its face. Rather, the court stated that the arrangement must
be carefully scrutinized to determine whether it actually pro-
motes divorce before it will be declared void as against public
policy. The court determined that no facts tending to promote
that there should be no reconciliation. If compensation for an
attorney's services is contigent on the securing of a divorce, or
if the amount to be paid for his services is proportioned to
the amount of alimony to be received, the attorney is in such a
position that his interest would be against a reconciliation of the
parties .... A contract for the payment of a fee to an attorney
contingent upon his procuring a divorce for his client ... is
void as against public policy.
246 Minn. at 504, 75 N.W.2d at 768.
5. Baskerville v. Baskerville, 246 finn. 496, 75 N.W.2d 762 (1956).
6. Coons v. Kary, 263 Cal. App. 2d 650, 69 Cal. Rptr. 712 (1968);
Krieger v. Bulpitt, 40 Cal. 2d 47, 251 P.2d 673 (1953). Based on these
cases, the present California rule is to allow a contingent fee in divorce
cases where the facts indicate that it will not promote divorce. In Salter
v. St. Jean, 170 So. 2d 94 (Fla. App. 1964), a Florida court upheld a
contingent fee contract relative to the recovery of the wife's separate
property even though a divorce proceeding was taking place in a sep-
arate litigation.
7. Comment, Attorney and Client-Fees-Divorce Cases, 15 ALA.
. REv. 208, 210 (1962). At least with respect to wives this may not be
a compelling reason. Since in a divorce case the attorney's fees can
be charged to the husband, there may be little need to make provisions
for a penurious wife through a contingent fee arrangement. Courts at
their discretion have required husbands to pay both alimony and the
costs for a wife to prosecute or defend the action. Eck v. Eck, 252 Minn.
290, 90 N.W.2d 211 (1958); Gerard v. Gerard, 216 Minn. 543, 13 N.W.2d
606 (1944).
8. See note 6 supra.
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divorce were present since the contingent fee arrangement was
limited to the recovery of property in which the wife had a
right whether or not there was a divorce.9 The court stated that
an action to recover the wife's share of joint property as well
as an action for support or maintenance could be maintained
independent of an action for divorce.10 The court concluded:
In neither an action based on contract nor in one relating to
property [referring to an action for her share of joint prop-
erty] would procurement of a divorce have been a prerequisite
to the wife's maintenance of a suit against her husband.
9. 188 N.W.2d at 766. The court stated:
It is well established in this state that when a husband obtains
property with funds belonging to his wife, such property is held
in trust for the wife, and she may, regardless of whether a
divorce is sought, maintain an action to recover the property.
Thus here the contingent fee contract was for an action which was not
dependant on or ancillary to a divorce proceeding.
10. 188 N.W.2d at 765. Certainly this is a correct assumption by the
court. If joint property has been wrongfully taken by the husband, the
wife should be able to recover her property at any time without a
divorce. Where a husband absconds with joint property, the wife may
maintain an action for the recovery of her share of the property just as
she would be able to sue a third party for conversion.
A distinction must be made between the recovery of a wife's sep-
arate property and a property settlement connected with a divorce.
Bride v. Walker, 206 Ark. 498, 500, 176 S.W.2d 148, 149 (1943) (separate
property means property that the wife owns in her individual right as
distinguished from those rights growing out of the marital relation);
Salter v. St. Jean, 170 So. 2d 94, 95 (Fla. App. 1964) (court distinguished
between a property settlement and the recovery of a wife's separate prop-
erty); Bost v. Bost, 234 N.C. 554, 557, 67 S.E.2d 745, 747 (1951) (property
settlement agreement means the full and final settlement of all prop-
erty rights of every kind and character as well as the cessation of
marital relations). A property settlement agreement is tied to a divorce
proceeeding and involves the distribution of property and is often
awarded to a wife in lieu of alimony. The facts of the instant case in-
volved both types of actions. The first contract was for representation
in divorce proceedings with a property settlement as to the homestead
and personal property contained therein. The second contract was a
contingent fee arrangement for the recovery of the wife's share of
stocks, securities and cash taken by the husband. While the first
contract involved property obtainable only if there was a divorce,
the second contract was for the recovery of the wife's property and
did not depend on whether a divorce was obtained. Since the di-
vorce was a prerequisite to a property recovery under the first con-
tract, had there been a contingent fee contract regarding the recovery
of that property it would clearly have been promotive of divorce and
thus invalid. Since divorce was not a prerequisite to a property re-
covery under the second contract, a contingent fee contract would not
promote divorce. Thus, the Burns case itself emphasizes that a distinc-
tion should be made between the recovery of a share of joint property
and a property settlement connected with a divorce; thus when the
underlying action in a contingent fee contract may be maintained in-




Hence, on the facts presented, it cannot be said that the con-
tingent fee arrangement here involved was one necessarily
promotive of divorce."'
Thus the underlying rationale for the decision of the court was
that where the contingent fee contract is for an action independ-
ent of divorce it does not promote divorce.
12
Logically and analytically there is little doubt that the inde-
pendent action rationale makes sense. Since the fee is not con-
tingent on the procurement of a divorce, the basic policy objec-
tion-that the contingent fee contract allows payment only if
the attorney procures the divorce-is no longer present. This
would seem to be particularly true with a support and main-
tenance action, which is dependent on the continuance of the
marriage relation.1 3  The court wholeheartedly embraced this
logic.
It may be argued, however, that from a more practical and
realistic viewpoint, the independent action rationale may be
superficial. Particularly when there is a concurrent divorce
action being handled by the same attorney,'4 a contingent fee
contract to recover the wife's equitable share of property taken
by her husband (e.g., Burns) may promote divorce even though
that action is not dependent on the procurement of divorce. The
attorney would have a strong financial inducement to recover
the property rather than to reconcile the parties. By investi-
gating one spouse on behalf of the other, the attorney could
easily create an atmosphere of antagonism and unjustifiable
harassment between them. Furthermore, the attorney might
11. 188 N.W.2d at 766.
12. The Burns court placed primary emphasis on the fact that the
contingent fee contract was for an action independent of divorce, not the
mere fact that there were two separate contracts. The danger in relying
on separate contracts, without examining the relationship between the
actions underlying those contracts, is the possible subterfuge that could
be employed by an attorney. He could execute a contract for a sum
certain for divorce representation and at the same time execute a con-
tingent fee contract for the recovery of property with no serious intention
of recovering property except as part of the divorce action.
13. See Donigan v. Donigan, 236 Minn. 516, 53 N.W.2d 635 (1952);
Waller v. Waller, 160 Minn. 431, 200 N.W. 480 (1924). A suit for main-
tenance and support is an affirmance of the marriage relationship.
Maintenance and support refers to the wife's allowance in an action
where the marriage relation is continued but the spouses are apart. The
necessity of the continuance of the marriage relationship in a support
or maintenance action illustrates that it is independent of a divorce
action which is a dissolution of that relationship. Thus it is most diffi-
cult to see how a contingent fee contract for support and maintenance
action will promote divorce.
14, This situation existed in the Burns case.
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then have a pecuniary interest in preventing reconciliation
because a reconciliation would often make it unnecessary to
recover property for his client. Assumedly the action would be
dropped and the attorney would be left without a fee except for
what he could recover in an action for the reasonable value of
his services.1 5
Nevertheless, there are rebuttals to the preceding assertions.
Encouraging, or at least not discouraging, reconciliation' 0 inso-
far as the attorney's role is concerned is not necessarily incon-
sistent with bringing an action to recover an equitable share of
joint property. Any antagonism would result from the existence
of the suit to recover the property and will not be affected by
the arrangement under which the suit is conducted.' 7 The
attorney would not necessarily lose his fee if the parties were
reconciled since the action might be maintained even though the
parties were reconciled. Criticisms of the independent action
rationale outlined above disregard the fact that the action is inde-
pendent of divorce, since they emphasize the inconsistency of
maintaining the action and reconciliation. However, because the
action is totally independent of the procurement of a divorce,
no such inconsistency exists. Reconciliation of the parties may
15. Furthermore, if the contingent fee contract promotes divorce
then under the Baskerville rule the attorney may not even recover in
quantum meruit. This would not be true as to a set fee because a
statute provides that the court may award attorney's fees if a divorce
action is abandoned. MINN. STAT. § 518.14 (1969). Thus it would
appear that a contingent fee arrangement would give the attorney a
stronger pecuniary interest in preventing reconciliation than a set fee.
However, there are two countervailing considerations to such
reasoning. First, if the contingent fee arrangement promotes divorce
then it is void and the attorney can recover nothing even though he is
successful and the parties remain unreconciled. Second, if the action
is independent of divorce and the independent rationale test is applied,
the contingent fee arrangement does not promote divorce and the
Baskerville rule does not apply to prevent recovery in quantum meruit.
16. The policy behind prohibiting contingent fees in divorce cases
is that no obstacle should be placed in the way of reconciliation where
differences have arisen. The policy is concerned with the attorney's
interest in preventing reconciliation by reason of the contingent fee
rather than the duty to bring the parties to a reconciliation. Therefore,
the policies underlying the rule certainly do not require the attorney to
attempt to reconcile the parties. Cf., Newman v. Freitas, 129 Cal. 283,
61 P. 907 (1900); Dannenberg v. Dannenberg, 151 Kan. 600, 100 P.2d 667
(1940); Annot., 30 A.L.R. 188 (1924). See 28 Norm DAME LAWYER 259,
262 (1953) (recent decision); Comment, supra note 1, at 122.
17. This is not completely true because the presence of a contingent
fee rather than a set fee may cause the attorney to prosecute the action




not be inconsistent with the pecuniary interest of the attorney if
the contingent fee contract is for an independent action.
Nevertheless, the court's failure to engage in further factual
inquiry and analysis after it established that the contingent fee
contract was for an action independent of divorce is regrettable.
It should have carefully analyzed the facts to determine whether
the attorney had, in fact, a pecuniary interest in preventing
reconciliation. After having chosen a flexible analysis, the court
should not have arbitrarily employed the independent action
rationale without qualification.
The court also relied on a second factor to bolster its con-
clusion that there was no promotion of divorce.1 5 It stated that
under the facts and circumstances of this case successful recov-
ery of the property was at best speculative and that the pros-
pects for reconciliation were improbable. 19 The court pointed
out that the husband had initiated two divorce actions in Nev-
ada, that the desertion was of some years duration and that the
whereabouts of the husband were unknown. Thus the court
appears to have held that where there is virtually no possibility
of reconciliation a contingent fee contract will not promote
divorce and therefore is not contrary to public policy. This
result would obtain whether or not the contract was for an action
independent of divorce proceedings. Although on the facts of
the instant case the parties were clearly beyond reconciliation,
whether this factor can be .a useful guideline for future cases
is questionable. The factual determination of the probability
of reconciliation is a difficult one. Certainly a desertion of sev-
eral years duration meets the test, but future courts will have
difficulty in determining whether a desertion for a short period
of time will qualify, or whether many other factual situations
involving unstable marriages are to be considered beyond recon-
ciliation. For example, it is conceivable, though doubtful, that
a couple separated for several years may intend to reconcile.
However, to employ this factor effectively courts would have to
engage in comprehensive collateral inquiries regarding the rela-
tionship between the husband and wife in order to determine
whether they could be reconciled. Such inquiries would place
a great burden of factual investigation on both the court and
the attorneys. Thus the utility of this factor is questionable
because at best it is an uncertain and obscure aid in determin-
ing whether a contingent fee arrangement promotes divorce.




Furthermore, this factor might encourage an attorney to
accept contingent fee arrangements in divorce-related actions
based solely on his belief that the parties could not be recon-
ciled. This is objectionable for two reasons. First, once the
contingent fee contract is executed the attorney has a pecuniary
interest in discouraging reconciliation. This is undesirable and
certainly contrary to the public policy against the destruction
of marriages. Second, the attorney is ill-equipped profession-
ally to determine when marital discord is so great that the pos-
sibility of reconcilation is remote. He should not be forced to
make this judgment at the risk of being denied his fee should
the court determine otherwise. No other court has considered
the unlikelihood of reconciliation in upholding a contingent fee
contract in a divorce proceeding.20 The Minnesota courts cer-
tainly should not accept it as the controlling factor in future
cases.
The preferable rule is one which not only maintains the basic
policy of keeping the marriage together by not discouraging
reconciliation of the parties, but also does not discourage a con-
tingent fee contract where it is to the benefit of a party. The
independent action rationale is logical and justifiable but should
not be dispositive without further inquiry into the facts and
circumstances of the case. The attorney should not be encour-
aged to negotiate contingent fee contracts where a divorce is
connected unless there is no promotion of divorce and the
client could not maintain an action financially without the con-
tingent fee arrangement.
Although there are some weaknesses in its logic, the general
approach of the Burns court in abandoning the strict rule in
favor of a more flexible approach in determining whether a
contract promotes divorce is commendable. Such an approach
is necessary if impecunious persons are to be able to use con-
20. Krieger v. Bulpitt, 40 Cal. 2d 97, 101, 251 P.2d 673, 675 (1953).
The Krieger court in dictum talked about the considerations of public
policy appropriate to contingent fee contracts and stated that
where a marriage's legitimate ends have been frustrated and the
parties cannot derive from it the benefits for which it was insti-
tuted, the best policy is to permit dissolution of the marriage.
40 Cal. 2d at 101, 251 P.2d at 675.
See Hay v. Erwin, 244 Or. 488, 419 P.2d 32 (1966) (court refused
to enforce a contingent fee contract as to a property settlement entered
nearly one year and three months after a divorce suit was filed). The
filing of a divorce would indicate that the parties were beyond recon-
ciliation, but the Hay court declined the opportunity to use this factor
in upholding a contingent fee contract.
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tingent fee contracts in domestic relations actions. Furthermore,
the public policy against the destruction of marriages and the
promotion of divorce is not totally pervasive. In some situations
the legislature has affirmatively indicated that divorce may
be necessary if not desirable.21 Although neither criterion relied
upon by the court is directly related to these situations,22 the
court's willingness to abandon the strict rule perhaps evinces a
recognition that in some situations the policy against promotion
of divorce is not controlling. The future of the general rule
in Minnesota may be largely unaffected by Burns, however,
in view of its unique facts.23
21. The legislature has by statute allowed spouses to obtain divorces
where certain grounds exist indicating that the public policy of pro-
hibiting contingent fees in divorce-related cases may not stretch to the
point of preserving bad marriages. MINN. STAT. § 518.06 (1969) enu-
merates the causes that may allow for a divorce. Some of these are:
adultery; impotency; willful desertion for one year; drunkenness (habit-
ual and at least for a year); continous separation for more than five
years; mental illness commitment; and imprisonment. Many of these
grounds could present a good case that reconciliation is improbable and
that promotion of divorce in these circumstances may not be harmful to
the public policy.
22. Id. Some of these situations may be instances where recon-
ciliation is improbable.
23. Because of the presence of desertion as well as a separate con-
tract for a set fee for a divorce in the instant case, courts will have some
problems in applying the rule.
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